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CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S. AND
ICELAND: WHAT CAN A SMALL TOWN ICELANDIC POLICE CHIEF TEACH THE
U.S. ABOUT PROSECUTING WALL STREET?
JUSTIN REX*
Politicians, journalists, and academics alike highlight the paucity of
criminal prosecutions for senior financial executives in the United States in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. One common argument for the lack of
prosecutions is that, though industry players behaved recklessly, they did not
behave criminally. This Article evaluates this claim by detailing the civil and
small number of criminal actions actually taken, and by reviewing leading
arguments about whether behavior before the crisis was criminal. Rejecting
the “reckless innocence” explanation, this Article provides examples of
criminal behavior that could have been prosecuted and reviews the literature
on why there were few cases made, despite potential criminal activity.
Though scholars identify numerous explanations, this Article argues a
combination of inadequate investigatory resources and regulatory capture
offers the best explanation. This Article then explains Iceland’s different
approach and why it successfully criminally prosecuted senior executives
from its three largest banks, among others. Though the size of the two
economies and the impact of the crisis for each explain a large part of the
different roads taken, the independence and outsider status of Iceland’s
prosecutor also contributed to, and is instructive for, how the U.S. could
structure its regulatory apparatus, should it want to prioritize prosecutions
in the future.
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Well, first on the issue of prosecutions on Wall Street, one of
the biggest problems about the collapse of Lehmans and the
subsequent financial crisis and the whole subprime lending
fiasco is that a lot of that stuff wasn’t necessarily illegal, it was
just immoral or inappropriate or reckless . . . I think part of
people’s frustrations, part of my frustration, was a lot of
practices that should not have been allowed weren’t
necessarily against the law . . . . –Barack Obama1
[T]here are two fundamental reforms that we need; one is to
get adequate capital, and two, to get far higher levels of
enforcement fraud statutes. Existing ones—I’m not even
talking about new ones. Things were being done which were
certainly illegal and clearly criminal in certain cases, which in
fraud is a fact. Fraud creates very considerable instability in
competitive markets. If you cannot trust your counterparties,
it won’t work, and indeed we saw that it didn’t. -Alan
Greenspan 2
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, News Conference by the
President (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Obama Press Release] (on file with Concordia Law
Review).
2
Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Address at A Return to Jekyll
Island: The Origins, History, and Future of the Federal Reserve (Nov. 6, 2010).
1
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INTRODUCTION
In a 2013 poll, 53% of Americans believed the government had not
sufficiently prosecuted bankers for their role in the financial crisis. 3 Is a call
for prosecutions anything more than uninformed anger at business elites, or
did the individuals who played a role in the crisis do so within, and perhaps
despite, the existing legal boundaries? This Article weighs in on this debate
in the context of the United States and Iceland. While the U.S. failed to
prosecute any senior Wall Street executives for their role in the crisis, Iceland
jailed executives at its three largest banks, among others. Though the two
countries differ in many respects, including their economies, their different
responses to financial crisis prosecutions offer an opportunity to consider
what lessons, if any, Iceland might offer the U.S.
This Article outlines the criminal and civil actions against firms in the
United States following the financial crisis. Despite the frequent use of civil
fines and criminal prosecutions of lower level industry players and small
firms, there were no criminal prosecutions for senior Wall Street executives.
Next, this Article surveys the various reasons why. The simplest answer is
that bankers behaved carelessly, but not criminally. Rejecting this “reckless
innocence” explanation, this Article provides examples of criminal behavior
that could have been prosecuted, followed by several more plausible reasons
criminal prosecutions were found wanting. It then suggests that more
criminal cases should have been opened, using Iceland as a case study for
how this could feasibly have been achieved. An explanation of how and why
Iceland was successful follows, along with economic, political, and cultural
reasons explaining why the two countries chose such different paths. This
Article concludes with a discussion of lessons Iceland offers the U.S. and the
implications the lack of prosecutions has for accountability in financial sector
governance in the U.S.

3

Michael Erman, Five Years After Lehman, Americans Still Angry at Wall Street:
Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2013, 5:03 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wallstreet-crisis-idUSBRE98E06Q20130915.
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I. ACTIONS TAKEN: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
A.

Criminal Prosecutions of Individuals

Before reviewing the reasons why there were so few criminal
prosecutions, it is worthwhile to take stock of what actions were taken.
Though it is a popular conception that no individual has gone to jail as a result
of actions relating to the financial crisis, the claim is misleading, but only
mildly so. For example, the special inspector general for the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (the primary bank bailout program post financial crisis)
reported to Congress in 2016 that 35 bankers were sent to prison as a result
of her office’s fraud investigations.4 Though many were individuals at
smaller banks, a few top executives at banks with assets upwards of $10
billion were also convicted. For example, Edward Woodard, the CEO of the
Bank of the Commonwealth of Norfolk, was sentenced to 23 years for fraud.5
However, these cases are from fraud in the use of bailout funds, not for
actions that created the financial crisis.
Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been active in
prosecuting mortgage fraud. According to a report by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General, the FBI reached 2,760 convictions
for mortgage fraud between 2009 and 2011.6 However, these were relatively
low-level individuals, including mortgage brokers, fraudulent buyers and
appraisers, and fraudulent loan applicants.7 A few higher level bankers were
jailed in separate cases by the DOJ. Lee Farkas, chairman of Taylor, Bean &
Whitaker, the twelfth largest mortgage lender at the time,8 was convicted of
fourteen counts for fraud and conspiracy by the DOJ in a $2.9 billion scandal
that included selling fraudulent loans to government agencies.9 Additionally,
Lorraine Brown, the CEO of a loan processing company, received five years
in prison for helping banks with fraudulent paperwork related to subprime
4

Chris Isidore, 35 Bankers Were Sent to Prison for Financial Crisis Crimes, CNN
BUSINESS, (Apr. 28, 2016, 6:53 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/28/news/companies/
bankers-prison/.
5
Id.
6
AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AUDIT REP. 14-12, AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS MORTGAGE FRAUD (2014).
7
See Robert Quigley, The Impulse Towards Individual Criminal Punishment After the
Financial Crisis, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103, 108 (2015).
8
Id.
9
Floyd Norris, After Years of Red Flags, a Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/business/22norris.html.
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home foreclosures in the wake of the crisis.10 Though U.S. Attorneys
considered criminal cases against executives at large failed mortgage lenders
and banks, including Countrywide, Indymac, and Washington Mutual, as well
as the insurance company American International Group (AIG), these were
eventually closed without charges.11
On Wall Street, two mid-level traders at Credit Suisse were convicted
in 2010 for misrepresenting investments, as well as a trader at Jeffries, LLC,
who defrauded the government and investors by misrepresenting the price of
mortgage-backed securities.12 The most senior person for a Wall Street
investment bank to go to prison was Kareem Serageldin,13 who worked for
Credit Suisse and was found guilty of falsifying records to his superiors
related to mortgage trading.14 However, his portrayal as a significant
prosecution may be overstated. He was only middle management, his crime
did not relate much to the crisis, and the victim was his employer, not the
public.15 The focus on Serageldin as the most senior Wall Street official to go
to prison misses the point—he got so much attention because there was
simply no one else to focus on.16 In other instances, the DOJ was unsuccessful
in its criminal prosecution of individuals, most prominently in the case of two
Bear Sterns executives.17 According to U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder,
the DOJ did its best to prosecute, but the cases were too weak.18
10

Don Mayer et al., Crime and Punishment (or the Lack Thereof) for Financial Fraud in the
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies for Legal and Ethical Lapses, 51 AM.
BUS. L.J. 515, 516 n.5 (2014).
11
GREGG BARAK, THEFT OF A NATION: WALL STREET LOOTING AND FEDERAL
REGULATORY COLLUDING 86–87 (2012); see also Jason M. Breslow, As Deadlines Loom for
Financial Crisis Cases, Prosecutors Weigh Their Options, PBS: FRONTLINE (Jan. 22,
2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/as-deadlines-loom-for-financial-crisiscases-prosecutors-weigh-their-options/.
12
Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial Crisis
Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 168–69 (2015).
13
Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-onetop-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html?_r=0.
14
Haugh, supra note 12, at 157.
15
Id. at 156.
16
Id. at 157.
17
See generally Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives
Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/
01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/.
18
Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., National Press Club Luncheon with Attorney General Eric Holder
(Feb. 17, 2015). U.S. Attorney General Holder further noted:
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In early 2015, Holder gave U.S. Attorneys 90 days to come up with
cases to charge individual Wall Street executives, but the deadline passed
without any significant action due to the statute of limitations.19 Based on
these results, with only a few exceptions, there have been no significant
criminal prosecutions for senior financial executives and their actions related
to the financial crisis: “the number of criminal convictions of truly high-level
executives related to the financial crisis stands at zero.”20 This number stands
in sharp contrast with Iceland’s aggressive stance, as well as the US’
prosecutorial aggression after the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s, after
which over 1,000 individuals and executives who went to prison, despite that
crisis being much smaller in magnitude.21
B.

Criminal Prosecution of Banks

What about criminal prosecutions of banks rather than the individuals
working for them? To punish banks, the DOJ relied primarily on nonprosecution agreements and deferred prosecution agreements, rather than
criminal convictions. Non-prosecution agreements are agreements between
the company and the DOJ that the company will take action to correct its
wrongdoing.22 Deferred prosecution agreements are stronger in that they
So I think that what we have done has been appropriate. As I say, we have
this ongoing examination of whether individual cases ought to be brought.
But to the extent that individuals have not been prosecuted, people should
understand it is not for lack of trying. These are the kinds of cases that
people come to the Justice Department to make. Young people who want
to be assistant U.S. attorneys in the southern district of New York and
eastern district of Virginia, San Francisco, live for these big cases. The
inability to make them, at least to this point, has not been as a result of a
lack of effort.
Id.
See Alison Fitzgerald, Bankers From Major Institutions Still Haven’t Been Held
Responsible for Financial Crash, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 22, 2015, 5:00 AM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/05/22/17377/bankers-major-institutions-still-haventbeen-held-responsible-financial-crash.
20
Haugh, supra note 12, at 158.
21
William D. Cohan, How Wall Street’s Bankers Stayed Out of Jail, ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/how-wall-streets-bankers-stayedout-of-jail/399368/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). This Article returns to this point and whether
the S&L crisis provides a fair point of comparison, below.
22
See Len Lyons & Audra Marino, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution
Agreements and Monitoring Services, MARCUM, http://www.marcumllp.com/insightsnews/deferred-prosecution-agreements-non-prosecution-agreements-and-monitoringservices (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
19
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involve the DOJ filing criminal charges in court but agreeing to withdraw
them pending corporate reforms and the appointment of an outside party to
monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement.23 Both usually include
large criminal fines. After being used against banks and financial institutions
rarely between 2001 and 2014, the use of non-prosecution agreements
jumped dramatically in 2015 to 80.24 Yet, these agreements rarely target
individuals working for the institutions.25 Further, the rise in recent
agreements serves as a poor proxy for actions related to the financial crisis,
as most are unrelated to it. Most of the agreements in 2015 instead resulted
from a large effort by the DOJ Tax Division to fight illegal tax shelters.26 The
first time the DOJ obtained admissions of guilt for criminal charges after the
financial crisis was in 2015, in a case unrelated to the financial crisis.27
Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Barclays Plc, and Royal Bank of Scotland
Plc all paid fines of $5.8 billion for colluding to manipulate currency
markets.28 To see actions by the DOJ and other regulators related to the
financial crisis, it is necessary to look to civil, not criminal, penalties.
C.

Civil Penalties for Individuals and Banks

Instead of criminal charges, the government has relied primarily on
civil penalties to hold banks accountable for their actions related to the
financial crisis. According to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) reports, the agency was responsible for settlements against hundreds
of individuals and organizations to the tune of several billion dollars in
fines.29 Table 1 below is taken from that SEC report.
23

Id.
Brandon Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J.F. 33, 36–37 (2016). Prior
to 2010, fewer than non-prosecution agreements were used at a rate of less than 10 per year.
Id.
25
Id. at 46.
26
Id. at 38.
27
See Fitzgerald, supra note 19.
28
David McLaughlin et al., Six Banks Pay $5.8 Billion, Five Guilty of Market Rigging,
BLOOMBERG
(last
updated
May
20,
2015,
10:56
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-20/six-banks-pay-5-8-billion-fiveplead-guilty-to-market-rigging.
29
See SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led To or Arose From the
Financial
Crisis,
U.S.
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last modified Feb. 22, 2017).
Interestingly, many of these cases are against repeat offenders who promised not to do the
same thing again in past settlements with the SEC; see Edward Wyatt, Promises Made, and
Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011),
24
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Table 130
Number of Entities and Individuals
Charged

204

Number of CEOs, CFOs, and Other
Senior Corporate Officers Charged

93

Number of Individuals Who have
Received Officer and Director Bars,
Industry Bars, or Commissions
Suspensions

54

Penalties Ordered or Agreed To

> $.193 billion

Disgorgement and Prejudgment Interest
Ordered or Agreed To

> $1.47 billion

Additional Monetary Relief Obtained for
Harmed Investors

$418 million

Total Penalties, Disgorgement, and Other
Monetary Relief

> $3.76 billion

According to an analysis that tried to capture fines from all regulators, banks
have paid out fines in excess of $204 billion.31 A similar analysis found that,

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/business/in-sec-fraud-cases-banks-make-and-breakpromises.html.
30
SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led To or Arose From the
Financial Crisis, supra note 29 (statistics current as of Oct. 7, 2016). Table was taken
directly from source. Id. The “Additional Monetary Relief Obtained for Harmed Investors”
came from “settlements with Evergreen, J.P. Morgan, State Street, TD Ameritrade, and
Claymore Advisors.” Id.
31
Jeff Cox, Misbehaving Banks Have Now Paid $204B in Fines, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2015,
1:58 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/30/misbehaving-banks-have-now-paid-204b-infines.html. This calculation includes all settlements in the financial crisis era since 2009, so
it probably overstates the size of settlements related directly to the financial crisis. Id.
However, the data also does not include settlements under $100 million, so it understates
the total as well. Id.
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in 100 mortgage-related settlements since 2009, banks have paid $164 billion
in fines.32 The largest offenders are listed in Table 2.
Table 233
Total
Settlements

Sums paid
($billions)

Bank of America

24

$71.23

JPMorgan Chase

13

$31.07

Citigroup

9

$12.26

Wells Fargo

8

$10.56

Deutsche Bank

2

$9.13

Morgan Stanley

9

$7.92

Goldman Sachs

7

$7.26

Credit Suisse

3

$6.28

Company

One final way to measure the financial impact of the crisis on firms is the cost
of litigation, which for the largest financial firms, hit $306 billion for the
years between 2010 and 2015.34
II. WHY WERE THERE SO FEW CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS?
A.

Careless, Not Criminal

The most consistent answer to this question from most politicians
and banks is that executives did not engage in any criminal behavior related
to the crisis. In other words, there were few criminal prosecutions because
there was little to prosecute. Perhaps executives made poor decisions, but
they presented the argument that stupidity, ignorance, recklessness, and
32

Dealbook, Where Does the Mortgage Settlement Money Go?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/business/dealbook/24mortgagelist.html.
33
Id.
34
Ben McLannahan, Banks’ Post-Crisis Legal Costs Hit $300bn, FIN. TIMES, (June 8, 2015,
12:04 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/debe3f58-0bd8-11e5-a06e-00144feabdc0.
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decisions that turned out poorly in retrospect cannot be criminalized. This
general claim has been made by a variety of people, most notably by the
President of the United States, Barack Obama. During a 2011 press
conference, the President argued that:
Well, first on the issue of prosecutions on Wall Street, one of
the biggest problems about the collapse of Lehmans and the
subsequent financial crisis and the whole subprime lending
fiasco is that a lot of that stuff wasn’t necessarily illegal, it was
just immoral or inappropriate or reckless. That’s exactly why
we needed to pass Dodd-Frank, to prohibit some of these
practices.
The financial sector is very creative and they are
always looking for ways to make money. That’s their job. And
if there are loopholes and rules that can be bent and arbitrage
to be had, they will take advantage of it. So without
commenting on particular prosecutions—obviously that’s not
my job; that’s the Attorney General’s job—I think part of
people’s frustrations, part of my frustration, was a lot of
practices that should not have been allowed weren’t
necessarily against the law, but they had a huge destructive
impact. And that’s why it was important for us to put in place
financial rules that protect the American people from reckless
decision-making and irresponsible behavior.35
When speaking about his efforts, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder argued
that the prosecutorial effort was there, but the cases were not. “The inability
to make [cases], at least to this point, has not been as a result of a lack of
effort.”36 Under Holder, the head of the DOJ Criminal Division, Lanny
Breuer, argued similarly by saying “[i]f there had been a case to make, we
would have brought it. I would have wanted nothing more, but it doesn’t work
that way.”37 Breuer said during a 60 Minutes interview, “I get it. I find the
excessive risk taking to be offensive. . . . I may personally share the same
frustration that American people all over the country are feeling, that in and
of itself doesn’t mean we bring a criminal case.”38
35

Obama Press Release, supra note 1.
Cohan, supra note 21.
37
Ben Protess, Breuer Reflects on Prosecutions That Were, and Weren’t, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
28, 2013, 8:49 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/breuer-reflects-onprosecutions-that-were-and-werent.
38
60 Minutes, Prosecuting Wall Street, CBS NEWS (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/prosecuting-wall-street/.
36
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Further, many of the transactions during the housing bubble were
between sophisticated investors in which one party made a bad bet.39 Trades
that large Wall Street banks made where they handpicked bad assets and
packaged them in investments and sold them to investors are cases of poor
decisions on the investors who bought them, not illegal transactions. Because
both parties were sophisticated, the idea that one party was duped by another
is suspect. Rather, the sophisticated parties had different views about the
future performance of particular securities.40 Referring to a case that Citibank
settled, one commentator argued “even really bad deals like Citigroup’s,
aren’t illegal. They’re not criminal. They’re not inherently fraudulent. If
Citigroup’s clients, all of them sophisticated institutional investors, were
foolish or careless enough to buy what Citigroup sold them, then arguably
they deserved their losses.”41 Simply put, under current law, alleged
“negligence, recklessness, [and] failure to supervise for those who control the
levers of financial institutions” are not serious crimes.42
Similarly, more theoretically-driven arguments from academics make
the case that the crisis was not a product of criminal behavior; hence, criminal
prosecutions should not be expected. According to U.S. Circuit Judge
Richard Posner, misaligned incentives encouraged the reckless behavior that
led to individually rational decisions that in turn led to collectively irrational
and disastrous outcomes.43 For example, though the deterioration of lending
39

Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 847 (2014).
Id.
41
James B. Stewart, Few Avenues for Justice in the Case Against Citi, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/business/few-avenues-for-justice-in-the-citicase.html?mtrref=www.bing.com&gwh=2B41B1843AFD303B40FD02649FF594DB&gwt
=pay. Lanny Breuer argues the same when discussing similar transactions:
40

In a criminal case...I have to prove not only that you made a false statement
but that you intended to commit a crime, and also that the other side of the
transaction relied on what you were saying. And frankly, in many of the
securitizations and the kinds of transactions we’re talking about, in reality
you had very sophisticated counterparties on both sides. And so even
though one side may have said something was dark blue when really we
can say it was sky blue, the other side of the transaction, the other
sophisticated party, wasn’t relying at all on the description of the color.
Rakoff, supra note 17.
42
See Buell, supra note 39, at 853. Others argue that there are laws that criminalize these
very things. See infra notes 48–75.
43
See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION (2009). Posner does not actually link his argument to the debate about
financial crisis prosecutions, but the link follows logically from his primary explanatory
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standards was collectively dangerous, it was individually rational for lenders
to continue or be driven out of business.44 Others argue that the crisis was a
product of mistaken beliefs, cognitive failures,45 and flawed human
psychology that explained away signs of a brewing crisis, combined with
irrational exuberance that the housing market would not collapse.46 The crisis
can also be explained as a “normal accident” that resulted from complex and
tightly-coupled technology and relationships in the financial sector, rather
than fraud or weak regulation.47 Though these theorists explain the crisis in a
way that minimizes the role of illegal behavior, others argue fraud is not
possible in an efficient market. According to legal and economic scholars,
who take the “fraud minimalist position,” fraud cannot exist for long in a
competitive market because competitive pressures would unearth fraudulent
information and force duplicitous actors and firms out of business. 48 This
view may go as far as to suggest we may not even need laws for fraud.49
The argument that there were no prosecutions because the conduct was
not criminal has been critiqued by a wide variety of scholars. For U.S. District
Judge Jed Rakoff, the claim is suspicious on its face. Before the crisis, reports
of mortgage fraud skyrocketed, and in 2004, the FBI issued warnings of a
growing mortgage fraud epidemic; and these fraudulent loans spread
throughout the financial system.50 Additionally, Judge Rakoff argues that the
mechanism for the crisis; people behaving rationally within a system of misaligned
incentives can cause a crisis without engaging in criminal behavior.
44
For a discussion of the system’s perverse incentives, see id. ch. 1–2.
45
See generally Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507 (2010). Kling argues key actors in the market believed things
that turned out to be wrong. Id. at 508. Regulators believed the same things, and thus did not
crack down more on risky industry practices. Id.
46
Quigley, supra note 7, at 145–47.
47
See Donald Palmer & Michael W. Maher, The Mortgage Meltdown as Normal Accidental
Wrongdoing, 8 STRATEGIC ORG. 83, 88 (2010). Though others have treated normal accidents
and moral wrongdoing as mutually exclusive, they do not think they need to be treated as
such. Id. Wrongdoing can contribute to normal accidents, and normal accidents can
encourage wrongdoing, which can lead law enforcement to be more attentive to cracking
down on wrongdoing. Id. For a contrasting perspective from the originator of the concept of
normal accidents, see Charles Perrow, The Meltdown Was Not an Accident, in 30A MARKETS
ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: PART A 309 (Paul M.
Hirsch & Michael Lounsbury eds., 2010).
48
Henry N. Pontell et al., Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail? On the Absence of Criminal
Prosecutions After the 2008 Financial Meltdown, 61 CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1,
5 (2014) [hereinafter Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail?].
49
Id.
50
Rakoff, supra note 17.
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s official report on the causes of the
crisis mentions fraud frequently.51 Given evidence of billowing smoke
throughout the housing market and financial system, can one not find fire?
Moreover, attempts to undertake criminal prosecutions were mitigated
due to inadequate resources and competing priorities at the FBI and DOJ.52
Put differently, resources and prioritization of other types of cases, rather than
the absence of criminal behavior, could explain under prosecution of criminal
behavior related to the crisis. Prosecutors also make decisions about whether
to pursue civil or criminal cases. White-collar criminologists do not make a
strong distinction between civil and criminal cases.53 Prosecutors may pursue
civil actions for a variety of reasons unrelated to the criminal substance of the
offender’s actions: from ease and lack of resources, to the desire to inspire
public confidence with swift civil action. Thus, the large civil penalties were
a choice, not necessarily an indication that criminal conduct was minimal.54
These general arguments beg for more specificity. Based on the
available evidence, can the case be made that particular financial industry
actions violated criminal fraud statutes at the time? A variety of scholars have
made this case.55 The arguments are too many to detail here, but a few will
suffice to make the point that there is substantial evidence of cases that could
have been pursued.
One area many scholars have pointed to for criminal behavior is
investment banks’ sale of mortgage securities called Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDO).56 For example, as the crisis began to unfold, Goldman

51

Id.
Id. For more detailed discussion on this point, see infra Section II(F).
53
See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION (1983).
54
JOHN HAGAN, WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS? THE POLITICS OF CRIME POLICY FROM THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE AGE OF REAGAN 44–46 (rev. ed. 2012).
55
See infra notes 56–76.
56
See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011). CDOs are a tiered financial product
divided into tranches, according to level of risk. Id. at 43. In the case of the financial crisis,
CDO tranches were composed of pools of Mortgage Backed Securities, which were in turn
composed of pools of mortgages. Id. at 117–18. The top tranche was composed of the safest
mortgages or mortgage pools (usually rated AAA by the rating agencies, a rating only a few
companies and US government treasury bonds enjoyed), and lower tranches rated BBB and
below, according to the risk of the mortgages the tranche contained. Id. at 71. The lower the
tranche, the higher the interest payment to investors. Id. The monthly payments of
homeowners were funneled through the security tranches to investors. Id. at 13. If
52

114

CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS

Vol. 4

Sachs realized it had a lot of soon-to-be worthless housing assets that it
wanted to unload (such as the Hudson CDO, which it was able to sell to
investors).57 Though it included assets on Goldman’s books, the CDO
prospectus describing the product explicitly stated in the sales statement that
it was not composed of assets on the firm’s balance sheet.58 This statement is
important because, at that point in time, buyers were wary of buying assets
that were being unloaded by institutions, suggesting that a more accurate
disclosure may have prevented Goldman from making the sale.59 This
omission violates Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.60 The
Hudson deal had the essential elements of the offense: “it must be a
misstatement of omission that is sufficiently material to affect an investor’s
opinion; that it is made intentionally; that the investor relied upon in making
his decision; and that directly caused actual losses.”61
Others have made similar cases against Goldman for securities deals
as well as similar securities sold by other large banks. 62 Securities fraud
statutes could be used to go after mortgage-related securities and actors all
along the securitization chain, from mortgage originators, who
misrepresented the assets when they sold loans to securitizers, to those who
packaged these mortgaged backed securities into more complex mortgage
securities (CDOs), and the misrepresentations related to the sale of insurance
on these CDOs.63
Another missed opportunity was criminal prosecution of Angelo
Mozilo, the head of Countrywide, one of the largest subprime lenders before
the crisis. Mozilo’s civil settlement with the SEC resulted in a $22.5 million
fine, though it was small in comparison to his $500 million salary while
homeowners began to default, those in the bottom tranches were first to stop receiving
payments. Id. at 43, 145.
57
See U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 7–11 (2011),
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf.
58
CHARLES H. FERGUSON, PREDATOR NATION: CORPORATE CRIMINALS, POLITICAL
CORRUPTION, AND THE HIJACKING OF AMERICA 133–34 (2012).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 191.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 133, 192 (discussing Goldman’s Hudson and Timberwolf deals); see also Mayer et
al., supra note 10, at 552 (arguing that Goldman’s Abacus deal is a clear example of
securities fraud); see also Rakoff, supra note 17 (arguing Deutsche Bank committed
securities fraud in the sale of some of its CDOs).
63
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working for the company between 2000 and 2008.64 According to the SEC
settlement, Mozilo mislead investors by not disclosing the inherent risk of
Countrywide’s mortgage products; a risk he acknowledged privately, but not
publicly.65 In emails, Mozilo described the products as “toxic” and said there
was no way to accurately predict their performance, though he heralded these
products publicly.66 A variety of scholars and legal professionals argue this
conduct was worthy of criminal prosecution.67
Scholars also argue for prosecutions for a variety of other actors,
including Lehman,68 AIG,69 the ratings agencies,70 various loan securitizers,71
and a variety of executives who lied during congressional testimony.72
Charles Ferguson, Mary Kreiner Ramirez, and Steven Ramirez make the
most comprehensive case, documenting potential crimes related to: securities
fraud, accounting fraud, mail fraud, bribery, perjury, Sarbanes-Oxley
certifications of false statements, RICO offenses, antitrust violations, federal
64

See Colin Maher, Crisis Not Averted: Lack of Criminal Prosecutions Leave Limited
Consequences for Those Responsible for the Financial Crisis, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 459, 463 (2013).
65
Id. at 472.
66
Id. at 472–73.
67
See HAGAN, supra note 54 (arguing that this behavior qualities under even the most basic
definitions of criminal fraud); see also Maher, supra note 64, at 463–65 (arguing the DOJ
could use the same provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act the SEC used in its
settlement); see also Marty Robins, Why Have Top Executives Escaped Prosecution?, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS at Jed S. Rakoff replies (April 3, 2014) (agreeing that Mozilo could be
prosecuted under securities fraud statutes and adds that statutes for bank fraud, mail fraud,
and wire fraud also criminalize false statements about mortgage-backed securities); but see
Matthew Goldstein, Angelo Mozilo Will Not Face U.S. Charges for Mortgage Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/angelo-mozilo-wilnot-face-us-charges-for-mortgage-fraud.html?_r=0 (arguing the DOJ obviously decided not
to pursue criminal prosecution); contra Michael Levi, Commentary, 42 CONTEMP. SOC. 683–
86 (2013) (arguing that Mozilo was responding to pressures of the market to keep him in
business, albeit in a reckless way).
68
See Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, Inside the End of the U.S. Bid To Punish Lehman
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013, 8:57 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/inside-the-end-of-the-u-s-bid-to-punish-lehmanexecutives/.
69
See YVES SMITH, ECONNED: HOW UNENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST UNDERMINED
DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTED CAPITALISM (2010).
70
HAGAN, supra note 54, at 208.
71
Quigley, supra note 7, at 140–41.
72
HAGAN, supra note 54. In trying to refute the claim they bet against their clients, Goldman
CEO Lloyd Blankfein said Goldman did not in fact bet against its clients and did not have
massive short position, when there is abundant documentation these claims are false from
the SEC’s settlement. Further, Goldman’s own documents refer to being short thousands of
times.
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aid disclosure regulations, and a variety of personal conduct offenses, like
drug use.73 These actions all took place within what white-collar crime
scholars call a criminogenic environment at particular banks74 and the
broader mortgage lending and securitization industry.75 Perhaps the most
blatant example of crime, and a telling example of the government’s
unwillingness to pursue even the most straightforward case, is the foreclosure
crisis that followed the housing crisis. Despite being a relatively easy case to
make, the government backed down and settled with major banks involved.
According to Mayer et al.,:
[T]he February 2012 fraudulent mortgage foreclosure
settlement—well within any statute of limitations—is
sufficient evidence that the government is not all that serious
about pursuing criminal charges against any major bank or
high-level bank employee: robo-signing and false affidavits
made to the courts are historically the stuff of which perjury
convictions are made. That is, there are enough smoking guns
in the HUD Inspector General’s report to signal a firestorm of
fraud. Yet it appears that when the stakes are high to the
banking industry, even though the fraud is clear, manifest, and
easily documented, the federal government will yield to
lobbying and highly paid lawyering, declare victory for the
public, and move on.76
One might counter-argue that the above accounts amount to little
more than “armchair prosecution,” which elides the difficult realities of
gathering evidence, making a detailed case before a jury, and meeting the
high burden of proof for criminal cases, beyond a reasonable doubt. To some
extent this criticism is fair, and this Article returns to this question in more
detail below. However, a similar argument could be made in response;
without actually attempting more criminal cases against financial executives,
the argument that prosecutions are too difficult is untested as well and
amounts to “armchair non-prosecution.” In previous white-collar crime
cases, prosecutors were able to gather the necessary evidence to convict
73

FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 190. See also MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A.
RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER
ON WALL STREET (2017).
74
Mayer et al., supra note 10, at 537–48 (arguing that Ameriquest and Countrywide were
committing fraud on a daily basis, making it part of their organizational culture and practice).
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Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail?, supra note 47, at 3.
76
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white-collar criminals; doing so is more a function of effort than the
particularities of the case.77 Regardless, the above examples suggest that
many market actors went beyond acting rationally within the scope of
existing law, stepping outside it to enhance their own gains. Perhaps these
cases would not stick in court, but we will never know because so many of
them were not pursued, were dropped, or were punished through civil suits.
Together, these suggest the reckless innocence excuse is weaker than its
proponents suggest. If cases were actually there to be litigated, but were not,
it is necessary to probe further into why there were few prosecutions because
the argument for reckless innocence is an insufficient explanation.
B.

Prosecutorial Choice

There are several reasons prosecutors may prefer civil over criminal
cases, even in cases of suspected criminal wrongdoing. Suits related to
mortgage fraud may be filed in civil rather than criminal courts to get
restitution for victims, rather than stigmatize actors with criminal penalties.78
Additionally, civil cases are easier to pursue, and can be brought more often.79
The higher burden of proof for criminal cases may deter risk-averse
prosecutors who want to make an easier, quicker case to impose civil fines.80
Civil cases do not need a unanimous jury,81 and juries tend to be more
sympathetic to victims in civil cases where money, rather than jail time, is the
punishment.82 Additionally, in a civil case, the victim and her claims are the
central issue, rather than being sidelined as a witness for a criminal case.
Further, defendants must testify in a civil case because they cannot exercise
their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.83 Lastly, as a
practical matter, it is not clear whether criminal prosecutions for white-collar
offenders are the best approach to deter crime. Some scholars argue we do
not have the evidence to answer whether criminal prosecution is an effective
deterrent for white-collar crime.84 Other scholars are less ambivalent, arguing
Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 269 (2014).
HAGAN, supra note 5454, at 198.
79
Sally S. Simpson, Commentary, 42 CONTEMP. SOC. 674, 675 (2013).
80
BARAK, supra note 11, at 126.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Simpson, supra note 79, at 675 (“White-collar crime scholars presume that punishment
works, that criminal punishment works best, and that corporate criminals are particularly
sensitive to criminal legal sanctions. This is an empirical question that has not been
77
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118

CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS

Vol. 4

for or against effective deterrence, but the claims either way admittedly lack
strong empirical evidence.85
C.

Statute of Limitations

Another constraint for prosecutions is the statute of limitations. There
is a five-year statute of limitations for most relevant federal criminal
provisions.86 Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by
Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, prosecutors have two years after discovery to act or
five years after the violation (whichever is earlier) to file charges. 87 Most of
the potential criminal behavior happened in 2005 and 2006, so by the time
the federal government started seriously investigating mortgage fraud in
2012, the five-year window had passed.88 There is a ten-year statute of
limitations for fraud and false statements related to financial institutions for
mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes if the fraud affects a financial institution.89
The time has run out for these as well. The statute of limitations is much
longer for organized crime statutes,90 but few have argued for prosecutions
using them.91 Consequently, going forward there may be a need to change the
statute of limitations for bank prosecutions.92
D.

Too Big to Jail

Attorney General Eric Holder worried that some financial institutions
were too big to prosecute criminally given the potential detrimental
macroeconomic impacts. During congressional testimony, Holder argued,
“[i]t does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with
adequately answered.”); see also HAGAN, supra note 54, at 689 (“[W]e have much to learn
about the relationship between financial crimes and their deterrence through criminal law
enforcement.”).
85
See Tristan R. Brown, Nobody Goes to Jail: The Economics of Criminal Law, Securities
Fraud, and the 2008 Recession, 41 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 343 (2015)
(using a law and economics approach and cost benefit analysis to argue that criminal
prosecutions would be an effective deterrent in the cases of financial crisis); see also IAN
AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (commenting on responsive regulation as an alternative to
criminal punishment to achieve corporate reforms for white-collar deviance).
86
Richman, supra note 77, 265–66.
87
BARAK, supra note 11, at 96.
88
See Cohan, supra note 21.
89
Haugh, supra note 12, at 194.
90
Richman, supra note 77, at 265–66.
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FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 190, 202 (making a brief case for using RICO provisions).
92
Garrett, supra note 24, at 47.
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indications that if you do prosecute—if you do bring a criminal charge—it
will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world
economy.”93 His view dates back to a 1999 memorandum, since labeled the
Holder Doctrine, where he argued that prosecutors need to consider the
collateral consequences for prosecuting large financial firms.94 Lanny Breur,
the head of the DOJ Criminal Division, echoed this sentiment in 2012 when
he said in a speech that prosecutors must consider the risks to the company,
industry, and to the U.S. economy.95 Holder later retracted these comments
during congressional testimony in 2013, stating that banks are not above
prosecution if the circumstances warrant.96
This fear of prosecution also has roots in the failure of the accounting
firm Arthur Anderson, which collapsed after a DOJ criminal prosecution for
its role in the Enron scandal during the early 2000s.97 Also, no major financial
firm has ever survived such criminal charges.98 Additionally, relatively
innocent parties, like workers who would lose their jobs, and shareholders,
may pay the consequences of corporate criminal prosecution.99 It is not clear
whether these fears and the doctrine based on them are considered to be a
well-founded excuse in the case of large financial institutions, though one
analysis thought JP Morgan could withstand a criminal charge.100 Further,
critics counter that this worry may apply to prosecuting institutions, but not
individuals working for these institutions.101 Criminal prosecutions of
executives would likely not bring down the institution,102 and financial
regulators suspend or bar individuals from participating in the financial
industry regularly. Regardless, in part as a result of these concerns, the DOJ
93
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(2014).
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has adopted alternative practices for handling corporate criminals, as
discussed in the next section.
E.

DOJ Alternatives to Criminal Prosecution

Since the early to mid-2000s, the DOJ has increasingly relied on
deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements
(NPs) as alternatives to prosecuting individuals or firms criminally.103
Historically, the DOJ prioritized criminal prosecutions of individuals until the
1980s.104 Recognizing the changing way prosecutors were approaching mafia
cases, which attempted to bring down an entire criminal organization rather
than individual mafia members, the shift to go after whole institutions, rather
than individuals, was thought of as a step up in terms of the severity of the
punishment and the magnitude of the case.105 Similar to the development of
the Holder Doctrine, the failure of Arthur Anderson and other major corporate
prosecutions from the early 2000s led officials to worry that the DOJ was
being too aggressive, and internal memos shifted the approach.106 As an
attempt to find a middle ground between an indictment and no charges, the
DOJ increasingly relied on DPAs.107 This approach allowed the DOJ to
extract big settlements and use the threat of an indictment to require internal
changes to the corporation, while allowing firms to avoid criminal
prosecution as long as they follow through on the stipulated reforms.108
Typically, the DOJ will do enough research and investigation to find behavior
that appears criminal, and use this as leverage to extract a fine from the
institution.109 Take, for example, the case of J.P. Morgan’s DPA in 2013, the
first for a major Wall Street bank, which stemmed from its role in facilitating
Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.110 The bank agreed to the government’s facts,
but the DOJ did not push for a guilty plea.111 J.P. Morgan agreed to pay
several billion dollars in fines, $1 billion of which went to compensate
Madoff’s victims.112 Supporters of this approach argue these agreements
103
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allow the DOJ to reach a settlement to achieve corporate reforms that mitigate
the likelihood of future crimes, all without the risk of firms failing.113
There are several downsides to the approach, however. First, because
the cases do not go to trial, the DOJ prevents further details from reaching
the public record.114 Instead, the public gets only a brief overview of facts
that led to the settlement.115 Second, these agreements require different types
of investigations, and because the case never goes to trial, attorneys never
develop the skills to prosecute individuals.116 In other words, they fail to
develop the needed expertise to make criminal cases against individuals and
firms. Third, the terms of DPAs allow institutions to investigate themselves
because firms hire former prosecutors to do an internal investigation, and then
report to the DOJ with changes the firm promises to make.117 Put differently,
the worry here is there may be too cozy a relationship between the contracted
party and the firm—though others have worried that DPAs are ripe for
prosecutorial overreach and are in need of reigning in.118 Fourth, and most
importantly for the argument in this Article, is these agreements hold the
wrong people responsible.119 The firm, employees, and shareholders
ultimately pay the cost, rather than the individual executives responsible for
the behavior in the first place. Consequently, individuals are rarely held
responsible for their actions. In DPAs and NPs that name individuals (which
is rare), the individuals are typically low-level employees who receive little
jail time, if any.120
F.

Competing Priorities and Inadequate Resources

White-collar criminal convictions are in part a product of the criminal
justice system’s capacity to find, label, and prosecute crimes.121 Financial
frauds strain the system’s capacity because they are complex, difficult to
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prosecute, and require a lot of resources to pursue.122 In the years post crisis,
key government agencies faced competing priorities about where to allocate
limited agency resources, which affected their ability to pursue cases
aggressively. The SEC gave more attention to Ponzi schemes and
misallocation-of-assets cases than mortgage fraud, the former being much
easier to take on and prove.123 The SEC was also severely underfunded to the
point where it had difficulty carrying out its mandate.124 Further, its travel
restrictions limit on-site visits to firms to investigate cases, and its limited
resources hindered its ability to hire enough expert witnesses for cases.125
Similarly, the FBI had divided attention because the 9/11 attacks shifted
its priorities toward terrorism.126 In subsequent years, the FBI reduced its
employees dealing with white-collar crime by 36% and the number of
criminal cases by more than 25% between 2001 and 2008.127 This was part
of an overall 50% reduction in white-collar crime prosecutions under the
Bush Administration.128 In absolute numbers, and for comparative purposes,
the FBI had 120 agents tasked with investigating mortgage fraud in 2007,
compared to over 1,000 agents investigating fraud during the Savings and
Loan (S&L) crisis, a crisis much smaller in magnitude than the crisis of
2008.129 Though FBI Director Robert Mueller approved a plan to allocate
more agents to mortgage fraud investigations in 2008, the plan was scrapped
after pushback from the DOJ, which worried that staff reallocation would
harm other investigations.130
The DOJ also had competing priorities. In the years following the crisis,
the U.S. Attorney’s Office had the most expertise in finance in the Southern
District of New York under Preet Bharara, and they focused primarily on
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insider trading cases.131 These cases were more straightforward.132 There was
also a risk aversion to losing cases and a desire to win headline-grabbing ones
related to insider trading, while banks were given a low priority.133 Though
the DOJ had the makings of a case against Lehman, it chose not to pursue
it.134 In part this risk aversion was driven by the acquittal of two Bearn Sterns
mid-level executives by a jury that “put a chill” on further investigations
according to one prosecutor.135
Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey also pushed against allocating
resources toward bank fraud. In spring 2008, after Bear Sterns collapsed,
Mukasey considered creating a task force to investigate mortgage fraud.136 At
the time, he said the DOJ was trying to determine whether there was a “larger
criminal story” to be told about the financial crisis.137 By the summer he
decided against doing so, despite pressure from some Democrats. 138 When
comparing the need for a task force to the early 2000s task force for the Enron
scandal, he said in public comments, “[t]his isn’t that type of phenomena,”
arguing instead the crisis amounted to smaller “white collar street crimes.”139
More broadly, under President Obama’s administration, there was no
“collective government effort” to investigate and prosecute financial
institutions.140 Under the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act in 2009,
additional money was allocated to the DOJ for financial fraud, but only a
small portion of the allocation made it to the agency. 141 By executive order in
131
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2009, President Obama also created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force to investigate financial crimes. Despite big expectations, one former
DOJ official referred to it as “the turtle” because of how slowly it moved.142
In a 2010 press release, the DOJ announced: “To date, the operation has
involved enforcement actions against 343 criminal defendants and 189 civil
defendants for fraud schemes that harmed more than 120,000 victims
throughout the country.”143 Despite these purported successes, it went after
low targets, and many of its purported accomplishments were started before
the initiative began, and several did not actually lead to criminal cases,
despite DOJ’s claims otherwise.144 In 2012, the task force had 55 attorneys,
FBI agents, and support staff—a small number compared to hundreds of FBI
agents assigned to investigate Enron and about a thousand agents assigned to
investigate the S&L crisis.145 That so few resources were “allocated to
investigate and prosecute those responsible for an $8 trillion dollar event
suggests not merely under-prioritization, but no prioritization at all.”146
G.

High Burden of Proof

DOJ officials also argued they were constrained by the difficulty of
meeting the high burden of proof for criminal cases, proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.147 According to one former FBI official, going after
financial misdeeds is “better left to regulators” with their power to level civil
million in 2010 and $0 in 2011. The FBI, authorized by the Act to receive
$75 million in 2010 and $65 million in 2011, was actually appropriated
$25.5 million in 2010 and $20.2 million in 2011.
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142
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fines.148 Part of the difficulty was convincing a jury that financial executives
were behaving criminally when dealing with complex financial products.149
The failure to convict two mid-level executives from Bear Stearns hardened
the belief in the DOJ that the burden was too high to convince juries.150
Further, prosecutors needed to prove criminal intent, which is difficult to do.
Here the argument was similar to the “reckless innocence” explanation for
the crisis: it is often difficult to distinguish between a crime and normal
business practices.151 Untangling these can be particularly difficult with
financial fraud. For example, mortgage fraud is more difficult to prove than
other crimes because a prosecutor must establish a market price and show
that executives intentionally overvalued the products, rather than simply
acted with bad business judgment.152
This line of argument is weak for several reasons. First, prosecutors
regularly meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for white-collar
criminal cases.153 Second, the idea that there is a lack of strong evidence to
show intent and prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt runs counter to the
fact that “evidentiary strength is generally a function of prosecutorial effort,
priorities, and institutional commitment.”154 Similarly, former financial
regulator Bill Black argues that one lesson of successful S&L prosecutions is
that you find fraud if you look for it, but too often the DOJ was not looking
for fraud among executives.155 Third, it is not clear whether the Bear Stearns
case was a clear signal that criminal cases were unwinnable. The case was
poorly tried by the government,156 and the government may have overreacted
to one failed conviction and gone too far in the other direction of not pursuing
these cases.157
Fourth, prosecutors may have more success if they used laws that
allowed for easier cases. The statute pertaining to penalties in the Securities
and Exchange Act provides for a standard of willfulness that would be easier
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for the government to meet to show criminal intent.158 The willfulness
standard does not require specific intent; rather, intent can be inferred from
reckless behavior.159 In fact, many of the civil cases the SEC successfully
pursued has laid the groundwork for the DOJ to pursue the reckless behavior
argument.160 Under other federal fraud statutes, some circuits have held that
recklessness is enough to satisfy the burden to prove intent as well.161
Alternatively, prosecutors could use the well-established doctrine of willful
blindness to show that executives have been actively ignoring evidence of
bad mortgages at their company.162 This doctrine allows prosecutors to ask
juries to infer intent through executive decisions to shield themselves from
fraudulent actions in their company, and the Supreme Court has upheld the
doctrine.163
H.

Bank Regulators Did Not Refer Cases to DOJ

Given the competing priorities and constrained resources discussed
above, the DOJ could use some help building criminal cases for white-collar
crime. Though the DOJ could build a case from scratch, one natural place for
cooperation is from financial regulators. The DOJ “depend[s] heavily” on
regulator expertise to help find and build strong cases.164 In the years before
the crisis, there were four federal banking regulators, each supervising certain
segments of the market: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).165 Bank
examiners from these regulators examined banks at least every 18 months,
writing an examination report that detailed each bank’s risk level using a
variety of criteria, which included asset quality, management quality, and
liquidity.166 For the largest financial institutions, bank examiners engaged in
continuous supervision, having their own office at the bank itself.167
158
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Regulators also rely on Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), which are
reports made by banks or their employees when they notice suspicious or
potentially fraudulent activity at their own institution, or in firms they interact
with, such as appraisers or mortgage brokers.168 One major constraint on their
ability to refer cases was the Bush Administration’s elimination of criminal
referral coordinators at federal agencies who served as liaisons between
agencies and law enforcement.169
Despite having eyes on the ground, and despite documenting the
major problems that contributed to the crisis in the years leading up to it in
their examination reports,170 the regulators made few criminal referrals to the
DOJ.171 The number of referrals declined substantially from the S&L crisis.172
For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency referred only
three cases between 2001 and 2011,173 none of which were related to the 2008
crisis.174 Likewise, the Federal Reserve referred zero cases related to the 2008
crisis.175 The OTS makes for a good example here: during the aftermath of
the S&L crisis, the OTS made over 30,000 criminal referrals.176 However,
despite the 2008 crisis being 70 times as large as the S&L crisis, the OTS
made zero referrals,177 and had not referred a criminal case since the year
2000.178 Countrywide, for which there is a reasonable criminal case to be
made, was supervised by the OTS on the eve of the crisis. Despite pressure
168
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from consumer advocates to force the OTS director to regulate the company
more closely and set up a hotline for whistleblowers, the director refused to
do so.179 Thus, a “primary reason”180 for a lack of financial crisis criminal
prosecutions is that, instead of helping gather the raw material to build
criminal cases, the regulators were “not pointing the Justice Department in
the right direction—or any direction—to prosecute wrongdoing.”181
I.

Capture

For some scholars, the above explanations are insufficient to explain
the lack of prosecutions. The lack of criminal referrals played a role, but why
were there so few criminal referrals from regulators in the first place? While
lack of prioritization played a role, what explains the priorities chosen by
agencies and elected officials? To answer these questions, it is necessary to
probe deeper into the relationships underlying the political and economic
order that fundamentally shifted power toward the financial industry and
pushed government to be favorable toward it. These arguments range in the
severity of capture posited between government and the financial industry.
The weak-capture version of this argument is that, at a time of
potential economic collapse, the government prioritized the health of the
financial system over prosecutions.182 Making sure the country avoided a
debilitating depression required shoring up the health of financial institutions
and making sure they could cooperate to stabilize markets. A basic fact of a
capitalistic economy is that the government relies on private markets for
performing certain public functions, so some degree of cooperation between

179
180
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the two should be expected,183 which does not mean the government is
necessarily captured.
A stronger version of the capture argument is that the government did
not want to implicate itself by aggressively prosecuting the industry. The
government, after all, had a significant role in fostering the circumstances
that led to the financial crisis, including: deregulation that created “Too Big
To Fail” (TBTF) banks,184 deregulation and lax regulation by financial
regulators, encouragement of homeownership and subprime lending, low
interests rates, as well as a large role in the messy cleanup after the crisis.185
Because few in government believed the early warning signs of a brewing
financial crisis and fraud epidemic, action after the crisis hit was difficult.186
After the crisis, the primary concern was in making sure the system was
returned to health, not going after bad actors.187 Though these actions do not
necessarily mean the government engaged or sanctioned fraud in the market,
prosecutors may be worried that financial firms and their employees could
credibly claim that the government encouraged their behavior and they are
therefore not culpable.188 Lending some line of credence to this argument,
during a civil fraud trial against mid-level Citigroup managers, a jury voted
to acquit in part based on the defense that government and industry were all
engaging in risky behavior before the crash.189 However, the jury seemed
willing to look beyond this argument in a statement asking why senior bank
executives were not on trial for their role in the bank’s behavior.190
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The strongest version of the capture argument is that government was
captured by the financial industry, meaning key governmental actors ceased
to serve the broad public interest and instead made policy and regulatory
decisions that served primarily the interests of the financial industry. 191 Part
of the capture story is the capture of Congress through lobbying and
campaign donations.192 As the financial services industry became one of the
leaders in campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures,193 both major
U.S. political parties supported financial deregulation,194 leading to 2009
seeing the highest level of financial deregulation in the previous century.195
Deregulation also allowed the creation of mega banks that engaged in deposit
taking, speculative trading, and insurance, which eliminated previous
industry divisions that caused infighting over legislation. These in turn
allowed the financial industry to lobby government with a consistent voice
for deregulation.196 Even after the crisis, during debate over financial reform,
when public antipathy toward large financial institutions was high, there were
only a few small organizations lobbying for more regulation of the financial
sector,197 leading one lawmaker to opine, in reference to Congress, that the
financial industry “own[s] the place.”198 Several decades of deregulation
coincided with efforts by elected officials, beginning with President Reagan,
to reframe the approach to regulating crime in a way that grew increasingly
adversarial and draconian toward blue collar street criminals while
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simultaneously normalizing white-collar crime through deregulation and
championing risk taking.199
In addition to elected officials, the financial industry also captured
regulatory agencies. The FBI’s approach to investigating white-collar crime
precluded the possibility of executive level financial fraud, suggesting its
investigations were too protective of industry executives.200 The federal
banking regulators were consistently lax in protecting consumers from
predatory lending,201 and in reining in risky behavior.202 The SEC had a
revolving door problem where its employees moved between the agency and
high-paying law firms that represented financial industry clients before the
SEC,203 illegally destroying a decade’s worth of documentation about
investigations into Wall Street corruption.204 The SEC was also lax in
monitoring capital at investment banks before the crisis.205 These behaviors
reflect a problem of the status of the financial industry in regulators’ eyes,206
stemming in part from the fact that regulators and industry players tend to run
in the same cultural circles and view the industry as part of their “in-group,”
with whom they have a relationship.207
Scholar Gregg Barak weaves these strands into a theoretical argument
that he calls a system of “bourgeoise legality,” characterized by inadequate
criminal prosecutions.208 The regulatory structure lacks the system capacity
199
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to prosecute cases.209 Government “corruption” through campaign
contributions and lobbying resources, combined with widespread financial
control fraud210 by major institutions, led to a system unable and unwilling to
criminally prosecute major players in the financial industry.211
J.

Synthesis

What are the strongest reasons for a lack of prosecutions of senior
financial executives? Though the capture argument has some merit, a host of
other more benign reasons also contributed to the lack of prosecutions.
Without financial regulators referring cases, and with competing priorities
and resources spread thin at the FBI and DOJ, the agencies certainly faced
administrative challenges. Further, the Justice Department’s approach to
handling corporate crime through deferred prosecution agreements was
decades in the making, suggesting it did not make an abrupt turn toward being
overly deferential to financial institutions in the wake of the crisis. Ironically,
the shift toward criminally prosecuting corporations instead of individuals
was intended to be an even tougher approach on corporate crime and was
scaled back somewhat after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, when
the DOJ and others worried it was being too tough after the collapse of Arthur
Anderson.212
Yet, there is still reason to criticize the approach, despite any
constraints. Even granting that the DOJ genuinely and correctly worried
about collateral consequences of prosecuting TBTF institutions, prosecuting
individuals does not come with the same risks.213 And when it comes to
individuals, there are simply too many cases left on the table, particularly in
209
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light of the fact that the strength of the case and the evidence to determine
that strength is often a function of actually pursuing the case.214
Here is where capture theory has some merit. The capture argument
has been criticized, particularly the revolving door argument that most closely
pertains to the DOJ officials who are making decisions about pursuing cases.
Critics argue that the interest in being friendly toward industry in hopes of
securing more lucrative employment after leaving the government is offset
by the desire to make a name for oneself as a prosecutor, one of the best ways
being to bring a high-level person to justice.215 If self-interest rules the day,
then there are competing self-interests at play: both favorable signaling to the
industry to achieve post-government employment and negative signaling by
pursuing strong cases. Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, argues that the revolving door argument is:
Ridiculous. It’s actually worse—it’s idiotic. Because when
people are in government and they are responsible for
prosecutions or for enforcing regulations, every single one of
them knows that the bigger case they make, the bigger person
they become and the bigger opportunities they have. That’s
not a good reason to go do these things. But some people
speculate that human nature being what it is, that’s how it
works. . . . [Big cases against the industry] don’t ever hurt
anybody’s career! And so for people to suggest that people
like me or career prosecutors in this office are holding back
from bringing a case against a bank president because that
would hurt their career prospects, that’s idiotic.216
Yet, these interests are not mutually exclusive. There is no reason a law firm,
or the financial industry for that matter, will shy away from hiring former
prosecutors who have shown themselves capable, regardless of the substance
of the case brought. Further, if such a strong incentive existed, why were there
so few U.S. Attorneys and DOJ officials trying to make a name for themselves
by trying criminal cases against top financial executives, particularly when
there seemed to be cases left on the table?217 Following the crisis, public
sentiment toward Wall Street was unfavorable, so the lack of Wall Street
214
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prosecutions after the crisis seems odd at best. Even key Wall Street insiders
thought the government would be more aggressive in prosecuting at least a
few executives to make an example and placate an angry public. 218 Is there
not a deep contradiction in the argument that prosecutors are fearlessly
willing to resist the pull of the revolving door by making a name for
themselves with a big case, and the risk aversion to pursuing further cases
that the DOJ showed after the Bear Stearns acquittals? These problems
suggest that even if key regulators were not completely compromised by
industry influence, as the strongest capture critics would suggest, the
regulators were certainly not operating completely independent of some
weaker forms of industry influence. 219 A culture of deference toward the
financial industry,220 developed in Washington, D.C. over the past several
decades, explains why there was so little willingness to be tough on the
financial industry post crisis. Without insights from capture theory, the above
explanations leave some of the story left unexplained.
This Article now turns to Iceland, where the story of financial crisis
prosecutions differs greatly from the United States. To what extent does it
represent a possible alternative course for criminal prosecutions for
individuals involved in the financial crisis? Are there any lessons for the
United States? This next section gives an overview of Iceland’s financial
crisis and how it combated fraud and abuse within its financial sector.
III. THE CASE OF ICELAND
A.

Iceland’s Financial Crisis

The drivers of Iceland’s crisis paralleled those in the United States.
Through the early 1980s, Iceland’s government had heavy involvement in the
economy through regulation and state ownership of key industries, including
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state-run major banks.221 Beginning in the late 1980s, and accelerating in the
1990s and 2000s, Iceland adopted neo-liberal policies with “an almost blind
faith in the virtues of the free market.”222 The economy went through a rapid
period of privatization, deregulation, and financialization, coupled with tax
reduction.223 More specifically, in the late 1990s, the government privatized
key state assets, in industries including construction, telecommunications,
and its three major banks.224 The growth and importance of the financial
sector grew as the privatized banks grew tremendously, increasing nine-fold
to approximately 865% of the country’s GDP (the second highest in the world
behind Switzerland225), and with the establishment of Iceland’s Stock
Exchange in the early 1990s and entry into the European Economic Area
Agreement in 1994.226 These changes brought an influx of foreign investment
as banks borrowed abroad and the Icelandic central bank was unable to
adequately control the flow of money across newly porous borders.227
Further, capital gains were taxed at a low rate, income taxes were cut,
corporate taxes were reduced, as were property taxes, allowing investment
and wealth to expand more quickly and helping the construction and housing
sectors boom.228
Politicians and regulators encouraged these trends through
deregulation and little oversight of the financial sector, convinced, like
American regulators, in the efficient market hypothesis that financial markets
could self-correct.229 One of the most consequential deregulatory decisions
was to relax mortgage lending, where borrowers could borrow up to 90% of
the loan, which added fuel to an economy already experiencing bubble
221
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dynamics.230 Regulatory capture played a strong role as government officials
pushed pro-business policies and the private sector rewarded them in
return.231 Approximately 90% of the Chamber of Commerce’s proposals
became legislation.232 These relationships were already strong given
Iceland’s history of state-owned assets and patronage relationships with
Iceland’s major political parties that permeated throughout the economy,
epitomized by the power held by 14 of the most powerful families, known
colloquially as “The Octopus.”233 Iceland’s history of corporatism, in which
major industries largely controlled themselves and received backing from the
government, extended to the major banks, which were sold off to private
parties with close political ties to the ruling political parties.234 Even on the
eve of the crisis, the ruling government parties trumpeted the financial
system’s soundness in public events along with the key regulator, the
Financial Supervisory Authority, publicly announcing confidence in key
banks.235 Moreover, the regulators had no expertise in international banking,
and were reliant on banks for financial and economic information.236 The
regulatory agencies were underfunded and could not keep up with the rapid
growth of the financial sector.237 International regulation was weak as well,
and Iceland’s banks received little oversight as they branched out; buying
assets overseas and international investors poured money into the Iceland
banks.238 Overall regulation failed on three fronts: "Three potential sources
230
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of prudential regulation—firms' self-regulatory risk management, Icelandic
governmental regulation, and international regulatory processes—failed to
decrease banks' exposure and Iceland’s vulnerability to crisis."239
In this environment, banks and individuals took on massive debt
along with exotic loans which resulted in lending money beyond the
borrower’s ability to repay.240 Between 2003 and 2004, Iceland’s stock
market grew by 900% and the average wealth of citizens grew by 300%.241
Its average income was the fifth highest in the world, well above that of the
United States.242 Icelandic banks borrowed large sums of money from foreign
investors, subsequently lending that money to private equity firms that were
owned by friends of bankers, or even by the bankers themselves, with
minimal collateral.243 This money was used to buy firms throughout Europe
before channeling that money back to themselves and Iceland.244 Their
financial relationships grew “incestuous” to the point where the failure of one
would bring down the others.245 They took on extra risk, because they
combined investment and commercial banking, the latter giving the former
activities an implicit guarantee of government backing (though unlike the
U.S., Iceland did not bail out its failed banks using taxpayer funds).246 Despite
this rapid growth, leading banks hid their vulnerability from the public
through corrupt loans and stock sales to each other, and misleading
statements to the public.247 These actions were part of a larger shift in
corporate culture in Iceland.248 The decade from when the major banks
privatized until after the Iceland financial crisis (between 2002 and 2012),
saw a significant increase in financial crimes.249 Also, the creation of a
criminogenic environment, in which corporate incentive schemes pushed risk
taking, companies searched for ways to stay within the letter of the law, but
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avoid its spirit, by aggressively searching for ways to circumvent it.250 By
2008, Iceland’s banks collapsed, along with its economy,251 in what was
estimated as the third largest bankruptcy in world history.252
In short, many of the same dynamics that led to the 2008 financial
crisis in the U.S., occurred in Iceland, but only amplified.253
B.

Criminal Convictions for Banking Executives

Iceland created the Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) to investigate
financial crimes that caused the crisis. Iceland had three major banks and the
OSP brought charges against top executives at each. Most prominently,
charges were brought against executives at Kaupthing Bank, known as the
Kaupthing Four: its Chairman, CEO, a former CEO, and the second largest
stockholder.254 They were convicted of market manipulation and making
fraudulent loans.255 Each were involved in a deal that gave a Qatari Sheik
millions of dollars in loans to invest back in the bank to shore up public
confidence on the eve of the bank’s collapse.256 Though the Kaupthing Four
touted the investment publicly, the fact that the bank was essentially investing
its own money in itself was not disclosed.257 All received sentences that
ranged between four and five and one-half years.258 The CEO of Landsbanki
and the CEO of Glitnir bank were sentenced to a year in prison and three and
250
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one-half years, respectively, for their involvement in loans to other companies
to buy stocks in the bank, which violated breach of trust laws in Iceland.259
By the end of 2015, Iceland jailed 26 bankers, handing down sentences
reaching 74 years in total (with cases still pending).260 In 2017, several of the
bankers who were found guilty began to appeal their convictions to the
European Court of Human Rights to argue they did not receive fair trials.261
There was some accountability for political officials as well. Iceland’s
ruling government was the first to resign in connection to the global financial
crisis, in part because of the well-organized and effective protest movement
in Iceland that arose as a response to the crisis.262 A commission created to
investigate the causes of Iceland’s financial collapse accused the prime
minister, finance minister, minister of banking and commerce, and three
governors at the central bank of gross negligence, and recommended the latter
to face criminal charges along with the head of the Financial Supervisory
Authority.263 However, the state prosecutor declined to press charges.264 The
head of the Financial Supervisory Authority was eventually fired for using
inside information to sell bank shares on the eve of the financial collapse.265
Parliament convened a special court to hold former Prime Minister Ger
Haarde accountable for breach of ministerial responsibility. Though he was
ultimately sentenced on charges of neglecting to hold meetings on the eve of
the crash to keep the government informed, the punishment was
suspended.266
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Comparing Iceland and the U.S.

Why was Iceland more successful in prosecuting financial executives
than the United States?267 First, there are key differences between the judicial
systems. Iceland does not use juries and instead uses independent experts who
assist judges in understanding the case.268 In theory, this difference aids
Iceland in white-collar prosecutions given that judges may be better able to
understand the complexities of financial crimes than juries, particularly with
the aid of independent experts. However, juries have convicted plenty of
white-collar criminals in the U.S., including bank executives during the S&L
crisis. The theory that financial crimes during the 2008 crisis were too
complex for juries to understand is untested in the U.S., given that no cases
against senior executives were even attempted. Further, there are mitigating
factors that made prosecutions in Iceland more difficult. Icelandic courts have
not been favorable to white-collar crime prosecutions in the past.269
Additionally, the country’s small population made finding people with the
expertise to prosecute difficult, such that, as the OSP grew, the likelihood of
staff knowing and even being related to the top bankers was highly likely,
risking a lack of independence.270
Second, key cultural and political-economic differences drove
divergent responses. Iceland’s status as a post-colonial country informed its
cultural values and shaped its political economy. On one hand, it had an
impulse toward independence and sovereignty, while on the other, it sought
to be integrated with the EU’s economy and its banks to pursue foreign
investment and assets.271 The crisis forced a profound psychological shock
and reckoning with this national identity,272 in which the behavior of bankers
became entangled. Financial behavior that may have been placed in a legal
gray area before the crisis was recast as illegal post-crisis,273 whereas U.S.
officials maintained the distinction between immoral and illegal behavior. In
267
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contrast, the U.S. has more difficulty reckoning with and stepping outside the
national identity that defines its politics. According to Louis Hartz, despite
political crises throughout its history, the U.S. has never strayed far from its
commitment to Lockean libertarian individualism, which makes the U.S.
hostile territory for political choices and movements that challenge business,
capital, and limited government.274
These differences drove a third factor; the diverging political protests
and governmental changes in the aftermath of the crisis. In Iceland, in the
weeks after the banks collapsed, a grassroots protest broke out that eventually
grew into the “pots and pans revolution,” which drew a large cross-section of
the population.275 Though the movement strategically united around the
broadly shared belief that political corruption was a major cause of the crisis,
a survey of Icelanders showed that they placed the most blame on bankers for
causing the crisis.276 Eventually, the center-right parties that were in power
before the crisis lost seats and the country was governed by a coalition of leftwing parties for four years. This political context provided more sustained
support and a more hospitable environment for pursuing bankers
criminally.277 The U.S. also had grassroots protest movements, but both the
Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party had stark ideological differences.278
Though the left-wing Occupy Wall Street movement helped change the
national dialogue around inequality, it suffered from internal divisions and a
lack of engagement with institutional politics,279 whereas the right-wing Tea
Party movement had more lasting institutional changes in Republican
primaries by pulling the Republican Party to the right.280 Additionally, though
the U.S. saw a change in presidential administrations and political party
control shortly after the financial crisis, the changes were less substantial,
given the two-party system in the U.S. and the relatively small differences in
their governing philosophies. Furthermore, the Obama Administration
274
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received criticism for retaining many of the financial regulatory officials who
served in the previous administration, who oversaw and implemented policies
that led to the crisis, as well as orchestrated the initial bailout.281 Given
bifurcated protest movements and a moderate presidential administration, the
political context in the U.S. was a less welcoming environment than Iceland
for the radical idea of prosecuting bankers.
Fourth, the relative size and scope of the crisis in Iceland narrowed
the range of responses. At the time of the crisis, Iceland had a population of
approximately only 300,000. Despite a small economy, Iceland’s nominal
bank assets had ballooned to 10 times the size of Iceland’s GDP.282 The
effects of the crash were staggering: 85% of the banking system failed and
50,000 residents lost all of their savings (constituting nearly 17% of the
population).283 In contrast to the U.S., Iceland’s banks were too big to bail
out and were not so integrated with external economies that others needed
Iceland’s banks to survive.284 Thus, the U.S. approach of concentrating on
banks’ financial stability using bailouts285 was not a viable option for
Iceland.286 In short, while key American officials argued that banks were too
big to fail, Iceland’s banks were too big to rescue.287 Moreover, Eric Holder’s
worry that there would be collateral economic consequences for prosecuting
TBTF institutions was not operative in Iceland because the banks had already
failed. Together, these made prosecutions a more viable option.
Fifth, Iceland made a significantly stronger investment in human
capital and resources to investigate and prosecute crime. Iceland’s Office of
Special Prosecutor started small, and struggled to find a director initially, but
by 2012 it had a staff of 100 employees, a caseload of around 200 cases, and
40 indictments against banking executives.288 Comparing that to the U.S. on
281
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a per capita basis, the size of the OSP is equivalent to the U.S. creating a task
force of “about 90 thousand employees and a case load of about two hundred
thousand cases.”289 Obviously, that large of a task force was not politically
feasible or perhaps desirable, but Iceland’s investment provides a stark
counterpoint to the United States’ lack of interest, and underinvestment, in
investigating fraud.290
Sixth, the nature of Iceland’s prosecutorial investment is different.
Whereas the U.S. invested in people in the DOJ and FBI, Iceland relied on
an outsider named Ólafur Hauksson to head the OSP, a small town police
chief who had no prior experience with financial crimes.291 Hauksson did
have expertise in pursuing criminal networks and used these tactics
effectively to gather evidence and to turn witnesses at Icelandic banks.292
Perhaps his best asset seemed to be that he was willing to take the job; when
the job was first advertised, nobody applied and only two applied after
applications were sought a second time.293
What he lacked in expertise, he compensated with more independence
from political and financial elites and a populist sensibility. 294 He grew up
middle class, having a sense of hard work and thrift from working jobs from
the time he was a young kid.295 Though he tried to move beyond being a
police chief, he was turned down for the job equivalent to the U.S. Attorney
General.296 This independence was important because he brought a fresh, and
different, perspective to the banks’ behavior. Whereas key elected officials in
the U.S. and key figures in the DOJ adopted the reckless innocence
framework to understanding bank executive actions, which treated the actions
leading to the crisis as normal (though sometimes immoral) business
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practices,297 Hauksson drew a clear distinction between business practices
and wrongdoing, using this understanding to drive his investigations.298 The
aggressiveness and results speak for themselves.
Seventh, the nature of the crimes in Iceland may have made it easier
to prosecute banking executives. Some of Iceland’s bankers committed
crimes that would have resulted in a conviction in the U.S. as well, while U.S.
bankers escaped such punishment.299 This argument is a variation of the
careless, but not criminal account of the U.S. financial crisis. Some of
Iceland’s bankers’ actions would have made for much more straightforward
prosecutions in the U.S., such as tax evasion and insider trading. For example,
it is highly likely bankers could be jailed for the Kaupthing Bank case if the
same actions were performed in the U.S. It is important to note this argument
also presumes a willingness to extend these laws to financial executives, but
this may be a good assumption given the aggressiveness and success of the
U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York against insider
trading.300 Yet, this argument misses the parallel between Iceland’s banking
elite misleading the public about the health of their company, while evidence
suggests internally they were much less optimistic and engaging in practices
to mask their capital fragility.301 For example, though the specific accounting
practices differed, the accounting gimmicks Lehman used to mask its
weakness on the eve of its collapse offer a good parallel, and the DOJ decided
to not pursue what could have been a strong case.302
Weighing the importance of these potential explanations is an
imprecise endeavor, but some have more plausibility than others. Judicial
system differences, cultural values, and the nature of the crimes are the
weakest of the above explanations. At the macro level, the relative size of the
countries and size of the crises left Iceland with a narrower range of responses
to the crisis. Since Iceland had no chance to leave its banks largely intact,
prosecuting bankers had little economic downside and some political upside,
given the anger of the protestors and the broader public. At a micro level, the
297
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choices of political actors outside government, and the politicians they
elected, created environments that made prosecutions more palatable in the
case of Iceland, and less so in the case of the United States. Within
government, the choice in Iceland to prioritize prosecutions and the choice of
an independent outsider made serious investigation into crime more likely.
This latter option suggests a promising place for reform, as discussed in the
conclusion that follows.
CONCLUSION
What lessons can be learned about increasing the future likelihood of
criminal prosecutions for senior banking executives? First, lessons from the
U.S. suggest the statute of limitations may need to be lengthened for certain
financial crimes to give law enforcement the necessary time to research and
build cases.303 This is particularly important, given the complexity of the
financial instruments that contributed to the recent crisis and the need to give
regulators and law enforcement the time to understand industry practices.304
Second, Iceland suggests the importance of appropriately balancing law
enforcement’s need for expertise about, and connections to, the industry, with
a healthy independence from, and skepticism of, it. It is noteworthy that
Iceland successfully prosecuted executives despite the economic power and
political interconnections of the banking industry that permeated Icelandic
politics and society before the crisis. To the extent it can be said that the
financial industry had meaningfully captured the political system in the U.S.,
the same could be said for Iceland, but even more so. 305 Would U.S. law
enforcement have been more aggressive if a small town police chief had been
put in charge of investigating and prosecuting Wall Street? This is not clear.
The aggressiveness of prosecutors after the S&L crisis, which is often held
up as a good model to contrast with the 2008 crisis, did so with existing law
enforcement agencies. To the extent U.S. officials want to encourage existing
regulators and law enforcement agencies to be more aggressive next time, a
group of former regulators and banking officials have put together a plan
303
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under a group called the Bank Whistleblowers United.306 Their
recommendations include stricter requirements on conflicts of interest for
agency leadership, increased hiring of expert staff, and restoring criminal
referral coordinators at financial regulatory agencies.307
These lessons presume that the criminal justice system’s focus on
punishment is the best deterrent for the kind of behavior that produces
financial crises. Jail may be a better deterrent for white-collar criminals than
other classes of offenders.308 Yet, even after the aggressiveness in Iceland,
there are still suspicious transactions in the newly emerging banking sector
that cast doubt on the deterrent effects.309 Others worry that too strong of a
focus on retribution will prevent the needed attention on creating the
appropriate regulatory structure that can foresee and forestall the next
crisis.310 Yet, these two priorities are not mutually exclusive; focusing on both
could reinforce one another. Given the lack of criminal referrals from U.S.
financial regulators, more attention to criminal actions could be part of the
vigilance that is expected for them to have over the industry. A strengthened
approach to criminal accountability signals to the financial industry that law
enforcement also plays a part in oversight of the industry that compliments
the regulatory apparatus. To the extent that incarceration is still the dominant
mode of punishment for blue-collar criminals in the U.S., extending this
model for their white-collar counterparts is appropriate as a matter of fairness,
and to make true Eric Holder’s promise “that there is no bank, there’s no
institution, there’s no individual who cannot be investigated and prosecuted
by the United States Department of Justice.”311
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